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Band-Aid Solutions: New York’s 
Piecemeal Attempt to Address 
Legal Issues Created by DOMA in 
Conjunction with Advances in 
Surrogacy 
 
James Healy* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
In California, in July of 2009, Cat Cora, a renowned 
celebrity chef, gave birth to a son as a result of an implanted 
embryo.1 The embryo was the product of an in vitro fertilized 
egg and sperm. Both the egg and the sperm were donated.2 Due 
to the advances of assisted reproductive technology (ART), this 
type of pregnancy and birth is not at all uncommon; through 
2006, nearly five hundred thousand babies have been born using 
such ART.3 Ms. Cora‟s situation, however, was a little more 
complex because the egg donor was her domestic partner, 
Jennifer Cora. The two women had been together for over ten 
years, and Jennifer had already given birth to three other 
children, also through in vitro fertilization. Indeed, Jennifer had 
given birth to her third child only a few months earlier and the 
embryo was one of two fertilized eggs, one having been donated 
 
  *  B.A. Columbia College, Columbia University (2008); J.D. Candidate 
Pace University School of Law (2012). The Author wishes to thank his wife 
and children for their patience and support as well as Professors Dorfman and 
Doernberg who challenged him to write and think outside his comfort zone. 
1. Desiree Fawn, Cat Cora Welcomes Baby Boy Nash!, CELEBRITY 
BABYSCOOP (July 23, 2009), http://www.celebritybabyscoop.com/2009/07/23/ 
cat-cora-welcomes-baby-boy-nash. 
2. Iron Chef Cat Cora and Her Lesbian Partner Both Pregnant, FOX NEWS 
(Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2009/03/10/ iron-chef-
cat-cora-lesbian-partner-pregnant/. 
3. Frequently Asked Questions About Infertility, AM. SOC‟Y FOR REPROD. 
MED., http://www.asrm.org/awards/index.aspx?id=3012 (last visited Jan. 11, 
2010). 
1
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by Cat. Although the couple will not DNA-test to determine 
which embryo produced the child, all four children are the 
genetic offspring of the same sperm donor.4 
If the happy family chooses to remain in California, their 
legal family status will be impacted by several laws and judicial 
holdings. Currently, the status of same-sex marriage in 
California is indeterminate,5 but the law does provide that 
registered domestic partners shall have the same rights as 
married spouses, including with respect to a child of the 
partnership.6 The California Supreme Court acknowledged that 
legal motherhood can be a factor of either genetics or giving 
 
4. Iron Chef Cat Cora and Wife Both Pregnant, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 
2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/09/iron-chef-cat-cora-and-
wi_n_173283.html. 
5. Same-sex marriage has undergone a turbulent history in California. In 
2004, the mayor of San Francisco began offering marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples despite the 2000 law, which limited marriage to one man and one 
woman. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2004). The Supreme Court of California 
ordered the city to stop issuing the marriage licenses. Clay Rehig, California 
Bans Gay Marriage by Simple Majority Vote, 14 PUB. INT. L. REP. 152, 152 
(2009). In May of 2008, the Supreme Court of California struck down the law 
as unconstitutional and effectively granted same-sex couples the right to 
marry. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008). For the next five 
months 18,000 same-sex couples were married in California. In November of 
that year Proposition 8, a constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex 
couples from marrying, passed by a popular vote, once again banning same-sex 
marriage. See Rehig, supra at 153. In June of 2009, the California Supreme 
Court held that Proposition 8 did not violate the California Constitution, and, 
therefore, same-sex couples could not legally marry in the state. Strauss v. 
Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 60 (Cal. 2009). Proposition 8 was then challenged in 
Federal Court, and in August of 2010, Judge Vaughn R. Walker held that 
Proposition 8 violated both the due process and equal protection clauses of the 
Constitution. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 
2010). The Ninth Circuit then granted a stay of Judge Walker‟s order pending 
an expedited appeal. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 
3212786, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010). This issue has become even more 
complicated in that the California Governors (Schwarzenegger and Brown) 
have chosen not to appeal the decision. See Carol J. Williams, Judges Ask for 
Court’s Help on Prop. 8: Panel Seeks Input on the Right of Private Groups to 
Defend the Ban on Gay Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011, at AA1. The case 
was then appealed by the political groups that placed the initiative on the 
ballot. It is unclear, however, if those groups will be determined to have 
standing in the case. Id. Although it seems inevitable that the Supreme Court 
will address, and ultimately resolve, the same-sex marriage issue, the 
procedural snag in this instance may delay that decision longer than expected. 
6. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2010). 
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birth,7 and further addressed, in 2005, the specific situation in 
which one lesbian domestic partner donates an egg for the other 
to carry with the intention that the baby will be the child of 
both.8 Ultimately, the court in K.M. v. E.G. held that a child 
could legally have two parents who are both women.9 The 
critical factor the court considered was the intention of the two 
women to act as parents together.10 
California has adopted the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA), 
which, among other things, determines the legal father of a 
child conceived through ART. The model statute provided that, 
when a married woman used donated sperm to give birth, her 
husband, assuming he had consented to the procedure, is the 
legal father.11 The sperm donor is presumed to have lost his 
 
7. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). A married couple entered 
into a contract with another woman to carry the embryo of the husband and 
wife and relinquish the baby after birth. The surrogate mother and the genetic 
mother both filed suits, prior to birth, to be declared “the mother.” Id. at 778. 
The court acknowledged that, although both women presented acceptable 
proof of maternity, under (then current) California law the child could only 
have one mother. Id. at 781-82. It ultimately found in favor of the genetic—
rather than the surrogate—basing its decision on the original intent of the 
parties. Id. at 787. 
8. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005). 
9. Id. at 681. 
10. Id. In this case the court had to deal with the intersection of the 
Uniform Parentage Act, adopted into the California Family Code, designed to 
protect and define the non-parental relationship of an anonymous sperm donor 
in an ART assisted pregnancy, which states: 
 
If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and surgeon 
and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated 
artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband, 
the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father 
of a child thereby conceived. The husband‟s consent must be 
in writing and signed by him and his wife. 
 
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (West 2010). For a situation where, in the same 
clinical setting, a woman donates an egg in an ART assisted pregnancy with 
intention that she will be a co-parent to the child, see K.M., 177 P.3d at 681. 
11. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (amended 2002), available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/upa7390.htm (“The 
donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial 
insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law 
as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.” (emphasis 
added)). 
3
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claim to parentage.12 In adopting the UPA, the California 
Legislature made an important modification to the model 
statute. The legislature removed the word “married” to allow 
single women to obtain donated sperm without the donor 
incurring parentage and the resultant responsibility and 
liability.13 
Furthermore, California allows second parent adoption, the 
process permitting a same-sex partner to establish a legal 
parent-child relationship with a non-birth, non-genetic, child 
through an adoption that does not terminate the legal status of 
the original parent.14 
So if Cat, Jennifer, and the four children remain in 
California, their domestic harmony should not be much in 
doubt. Under statutory law,15 and the decision in K.M. v. E.G.,16 
their status as parents should not be questioned. The sperm 
donor will not be able to assert any parental rights,17 and, to be 
100 percent certain, they could perform a second parent 
adoption—although who would be adopting whom is a question 
to be answered later in the discussion. What if, however, the 
family chose to re-locate? What if, hypothetically, they began to 
move around the country looking for a new state to put down 
roots? 
This Article will highlight the legal cross-purposes created 
by the inconsistent laws and policies of the several states with 
respect to same-sex marriage, adoption, and custody, and then 
will focus in more detail on how this inconsistency is manifest in 
New York State specifically. It will point out how the increasing 
use of ART, in particular gestational surrogacy, creates an 
increasing tension between inconsistent legislative, executive 
and judicial actions. In the end, it is likely that the legal 
 
12. Id. 
13. “The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician and surgeon or 
to a licensed sperm bank for use in artificial insemination or in vitro 
fertilization of a woman other than the donor‟s wife is treated in law as if he 
were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 
7613(b) (emphasis added). 
14. Sharon S. v. Superior Ct., 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003). 
15. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d). 
16. 117 P.3d 673, 681 (Cal. 2005). 
17. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b). 
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quandaries created can only be resolved by a constitutional 
declaration. 
 
II.  Overview of the National Conflict of Same-Sex Marriage, 
Adoption and Custody 
 
If Jennifer and Cat‟s first stop was Oklahoma, they may be 
surprised to find that not only does that state restrict marriage 
to a man and a woman,18 but it also does not recognize any 
same-sex partnership.19 Although in California the Coras, 
through their domestic partnership, would be given the same 
rights as married couples, particularly regarding their children, 
in Oklahoma they would be considered legal strangers in all 
aspects. 
As of late 2010, states have taken a number of different 
approaches to same-sex marriage. Five states and the District of 
Columbia allow same-sex couples to legally marry,20 eight states 
allow for some form of domestic partnership or civil union, and 
the rest have laws or constitutional provisions restricting 
marriage to heterosexual couples.21 States‟ different approaches 
to marriage regulation are not, by themselves, unusual. What 
makes them problematic, however, is how the federal 
government and, by legal extension the states, have chosen to 
contend with these differences. 
The Constitution states that, “Full Faith and Credit shall 
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
 
18. See OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35(A) (2010) (“Marriage in this state shall 
consist only of the union of one man and one woman.”). 
19. See 43 OKLA. ST. ANN. § 3.1 (West 2010) (“A marriage between persons 
of the same gender performed in another state shall not be recognized as valid 
and binding in this state as of the date of the marriage.”). 
20. As of the writing of this article, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire and Vermont allow same-sex marriage. See NAT‟L CONF. OF 
ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/HumanServices/ 
SameSexMarriage/tabid/16430/Default.aspx (last updated Sept. 2010). The 
status of same-sex marriage in California is still uncertain. See supra text 
accompanying note 5. 
21. California, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Washington 
and Wisconsin all allow for some legal recognition of same-sex relationships. 
The law is, however, particularly mutable in this area. Id. 
5
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Proceedings of every other State.”22 Traditionally, with respect 
to marriage, this constitutional clause required each state to 
recognize a marriage legally entered into in another state.23 In 
1996, however, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act 
(DOMA), which barred the federal government from recognizing 
same-sex marriage and permitting states to do so as well.24 
Given this permission, thirty-nine states adopted some 
statutory version of the DOMA.25 As a consequence, some states 
recognize same-sex marriages from other states,26 some states 
grant some recognition to domestic partnerships or civil unions 
from other states,27 and others, like Oklahoma, will not legally 
recognize any same-sex relationship from any state.28 
Since Oklahoma‟s law would seriously call into question the 
legal nature of the Coras‟ relationship and the certainty with 
which they both could be legal parents to their children, it is 
likely that they would try to find their new home in another 
state. If, instead, they went to Michigan, they would find a 
prohibition against joint adoption by same-sex couples.29 State 
law for same-sex adoption is even less consistent than for same-
sex marriage. Fifteen states and the District of Columbia allow 
same-sex couples to adopt jointly.30 Five states prohibit same-
 
22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
23. The Supreme Court clearly defined marriage with respect to the full 
faith and credit clause in Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934) 
(“Marriages not polygamous or incestuous, or otherwise declared void by 
statute, will, if valid by the law of the state where entered into, be recognized 
as valid in every other jurisdiction.”). 
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006). 
25. See NAT‟L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 20. 
26. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 308(a)-(c) (West 2010). 
27. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-34 (West 2010). 
28. See 43 OKLA. ST. ANN. § 3.1 (West 2010). 
29. It is both telling and ironic that, although it is widely understood that 
Michigan does not allow same-sex couples to jointly adopt, there is no statute 
or appellate court decision explicitly stating this. The basis for the prohibition 
is a 2004 statement by the attorney general of the state and the overall 
conservative nature of the Michigan courts. See Amanda Ruggeri, Emerging 
Gay Adoption Fight Shares Battle Lines of Same-Sex Marriage Debate, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 31, 2008, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2008/10/31/emerging-gay-
adoption-fight-shares-battle-lines-of-same-sex-marriage-debate.html. 
30. As with same-sex marriage, the law on adoption is often in flux. As of 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/5
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sex couples from jointly adopting,31 either through specific 
language in a statute,32 court decisions interpreting somewhat 
ambiguous adoption law,33 or a prohibition against any 
unmarried couples adopting. Since these states do not sanction 
same-sex marriage, they effectively deny those couples the 
ability to jointly adopt.34 Most other states are unclear about 
whether, as a matter of law, same-sex couples can jointly adopt. 
The statutes are ambiguous in that they do not explicitly 
prohibit the practice and often the courts have not ruled 
definitively.35 
If a state does not specifically allow same-sex couples to 
adopt, and the state does not allow for same-sex marriage, then 
the right of joint custody or visitation would depend on the local 
court‟s determination. As recently as 2007, appellate courts in 
only twenty states addressed the issue of whether same-sex, 
non-genetic, partners have some form of parental custody or 
visitations rights.36 Those courts used a wide range of standards 
 
the beginning of 2010, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, 
Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin are the states that allow joint adoption 
by same-sex couples. See HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, 
http://www.hrc.org/issues/parenting/adoptions/adoption_laws.asp (last visited 
Jan. 9, 2011). Yet, in Florida, a state traditionally showing antipathy toward 
same-sex couples, a state court of appeal held that the ban on same-sex 
adoption was a violation of the Florida Constitution. See Fla. Dep‟t of Children 
& Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010). 
Further, the governor and attorney general chose not to appeal the decision, 
thus ending a thirty-three year ban on same-sex adoption. See Mary Ellen 
Klas, Gay Adoption Fight Over, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, at 1B. 
31. States hostile to same-sex couples adopting are Arkansas, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Ohio, and Utah. See HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, supra note 30. 
32. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (West 2009) (“Adoption by 
couples of the same gender is prohibited.”). 
33. HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, supra note 30. 
34. Note how the two laws in North Carolina work to deny same-sex joint 
adoption. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-2-301(c) (West 2009) (“If the individual 
who files the petition is unmarried, no other individual may join in the 
petition . . . .”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-1 (“A valid and sufficient marriage is 
created by the consent of a male and female person who may lawfully marry, 
presently to take each other as husband and wife, freely . . . .”). 
35. See, e.g., Katherine M. Swift, Parenting Agreements, the Potential 
Power of Contract, and the Limits of Family Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913, 
950-52 (2007). 
36. See Deborah H. Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between 
7
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to determine those partners‟ rights.37 This situation is further 
complicated by sometimes conflicting federal laws. 
By the mid 1980s, every state had adopted the Uniform 
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA).38 This statute 
intended to, among other things, provide for the equivalent of 
full faith and credit to out-of-state child custody orders.39 
Significantly, the Act also states that one state cannot make a 
custody determination if there is a pending custody issue in the 
court of another state.40 This, however, can be in opposition to 
DOMA, which allows states to refuse to recognize same-sex 
marriage or legal relationships. An example of this 
incompatibility was litigated over the span of five years and 
across two states in the case of Miller v. Jenkins.41 A lesbian 
couple from Virginia, which does not offer or recognize same-sex 
marriage or civil union, traveled to Vermont to enter into a civil 
union.42 After having an ART-assisted child, the couple 
 
Genetics, Procreative Intent, and Parental Conduct in Determining Legal 
Parentage, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‟Y & L. 379, 393 (2007). 
37. For example, Wisconsin uses a four prong test to measure whether a 
non-biological mother should be granted custody. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 
533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (examining whether 1) biological parent 
consented to and/or fostered relationship, 2) petitioning parent lived in same 
house, 3) petitioner took responsibility for child‟s care, education and 
development, and 4) there was a sufficient length of time to create a bond). In 
New Jersey, the court used the Wisconsin test to determine if the woman 
seeking custody has acted as a “psychological parent.” V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 
539, 555 (N.J. 2000). On the other end of the spectrum, however, is Ohio 
where a court has ruled that parentage (and the right to custody) should be 
determined by strict genetics. Belisto v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 767 (Ohio Ct. 
C.P. 1994). It should be noted that, in the time since this decision, the court 
has acknowledged that this approach may be out of step with use of ART by 
same-sex partners. See generally Nemcek v. Paskey, 849 N.E.2d 108 (Ohio Ct. 
C.P. 2006). 
38. Courtney G. Joslin, Interstate Recognition of Parentage in a Time of 
Disharmony: Same-Sex Parent Families and Beyond, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 563, 576 
(2009). 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 2007-271, 2008 WL 
2811218 (Vt. Mar. 14, 2008); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822 
(Va. 2008). For a complete history of this case, see Joslin, supra note 38, at 
564, 583-86. 
42. See Joslin, supra note 38, at 564. 
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established permanent residence in Vermont.43 Subsequently, 
when their relationship ended, the Vermont court made a 
temporary custody determination. One of the women decided 
that she did not want the other to have any contact with the 
child and so moved back to Virginia and filed an action 
requesting full custody and sole legal parenthood.44 The Virginia 
lower court determined that it was not bound to recognize the 
Vermont determination, which was based on the civil union 
entered into in Vermont, because Virginia‟s DOMA rendered 
that union null and void. Simply, the court determined that 
DOMA, allowing no faith and credit, trumped UCCJA, which 
called for full faith and credit.45 The conflict occupied the courts 
of Vermont and Virginia from 2003 to 2008. Ultimately, the 
supreme courts of both states held that the original Vermont 
custody order was valid,46 although it took almost one-third of 
the baby‟s childhood to get this binding, final determination. 
As Michigan might not seem too friendly to the Coras‟ ART 
family, they may decide that the best course of action is to 
perform a second parent adoption, which they may have found 
unnecessary in California. For that purpose, they may travel 
south into Ohio. Unfortunately for the Coras, however, they 
would find that an Ohio court has held that second parent 
adoption is not allowed without the termination of the rights of 
the biological parent.47 
Second parent adoption restriction seems to correspond 
roughly in states that appear to have open antipathy to same-
sex relationships. Three states have laws banning lesbian or gay 
 
43. Id. at 583. 
44. Id. at 584. 
45. In point of fact, the Virginia court, alluded to in the appellate court 
ruling, referred to the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (“PKPA”) rather 
than the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”). See Miller-
Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 332 (Va. Ct. App. 2006). The PKPA 
has a similar full faith and credit recognition intention as the UCCJA on 
interstate custody and visitation orders. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006). 
46. Miller-Jenkins, 2008 WL 2811218, at *1; Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 
at 822. 
47. In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1998) (“Based upon the clear meaning of R.C. 3107.15(A), we find that the trial 
court did not err in finding that the biological mother's parental rights would 
terminate upon adoption of the child by appellant, a non-stepparent.”). 
9
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individuals outright from adopting the children of their 
partners, and the courts of three other states have determined 
that second parent adoption is not permissible.48 Six of the 
seven states also ban same-sex marriage or partnerships and do 
not permit same-sex couples to adopt children jointly.49 
Conversely, thirteen states allow second parent adoption either 
by statute or by a ruling of an appellate court.50 The majority of 
states, however, have neither explicitly prohibited the practice, 
nor do they have any court decisions ruling one way or another 
regarding the practice. 51 
Flustered, frustrated, and perhaps missing the warm 
weather of California, the family might travel to Florida, 
looking to establish legal rights and residence. Their stay in 
Florida, though, would be brief. While California afforded them 
the right to enter into a domestic partnership, which would 
confer all the same rights as married couples enjoy, Florida bars 
same-sex couples, by statute and constitutional provision, not 
only from marrying but also from entering into civil unions or 
legal domestic partnerships.52 Furthermore, Florida refuses to 
 
48. Arkansas, Mississippi, and Utah have statutes prohibiting gays or 
lesbians from second parent adoptions. Nebraska, Ohio and Wisconsin have 
had second parent adoption restricted by appellate court decision. Joslin, 
supra note 38, at 578-79. 
49. Id. (Arkansas, Mississippi, Utah, Ohio, and Wisconsin are consistent 
with their lack of same-sex recognition for marriage, joint adoption and second 
parent adoption). Nebraska most probably should be included in this group, 
but in In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374 (Neb. 2002), the court, in ruling 
against second parent adoption, also stated: 
 
[t]he county court also stated that Nebraska's adoption 
statutes do not provide for „two non-married persons to 
adopt a minor child, no matter how qualified they are.‟ 
Because A.E. alone sought to adopt Luke, the issue of 
whether two nonmarried persons are entitled to adopt was 
not presented to the county court in this case. Thus, that 
issue is not before this court on appeal, and we do not 
consider it. 
 
Id. at 378. 
50. Joslin, supra note 38, at 578 n.70. 
51. See HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, supra note 30. 
52. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.04(1) (West 2010) (“No county court judge or 
clerk of the circuit court in this state shall issue a license for the marriage . . . 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/5
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recognize, under its DOMA, any same-sex marriage or domestic 
partnership from another state.53 Unlike California, it is not 
clear whether or not second parent adoption is permitted.54 
In 2006, a Florida appellate court ruled on a case involving 
a same-sex couple that had two children through ART.55 Despite 
a fifteen-year relationship and the fact that the couple entered 
together into a sperm donation and subsequent co-parenting 
agreements,56 the only meaningful factor in determining 
custody, visitation, or child support rights was biology.57 The 
non-biological partner, acting as parent to the children, was 
considered a legal stranger.58 Perhaps shaken by the tenor of 
the law in Florida, the Coras might choose to make a final 
attempt at stability and clarity in their family relationships. 
They might travel to New York and hope for a clearer and more 
logical legal determination of how they relate to one another. 
 
III.  The Situation in New York 
 
A.   Marriage 
 
In New York State, the Domestic Relations Law (DRL) does 
not specifically refer to same-sex marriage as does, for example, 
the law in Tennessee,59 which forbids it, or in Vermont, which 
specifically amended its law to allow it.60 In 2006, the New York 
 
unless one party is a male and the other party is a female.”). 
53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (“Marriages between persons of the same 
sex entered into in any jurisdiction . . . are not recognized for any purpose in 
this state.”). 
54. The decision by the district court of appeal in Florida striking down 
the state‟s statutory ban on homosexual adoption, see supra note 30 and 
accompanying text, did not address whether or not second parent adoption, 
regardless of sexual orientation, would be permitted. 
55. See Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
56. Id. at 670. 
57. Id. at 673. 
58. Id. at 672-73. 
59. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113(a) (West 2010) (“[T]he relationship of one 
(1) man and one (1) woman shall be the only legally recognized marital 
contract in this state in order to provide the unique and exclusive rights and 
privileges to marriage.”). 
60. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2010) (substituted “two people” for “one 
11
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Court of Appeals determined that, although the DRL does not 
explicitly define marriage as between a man and a woman, the 
intent of the 1909 legislature to limit marriage to members of 
the opposite sex was implicit in its use of the terms “husband” 
and “wife” in descriptive and regulatory sections.61 The court 
viewed the law as specifically prohibiting same-sex marriage in 
New York.62 The legal issue in this case, then, became whether 
or not the court would determine that the law, as defined, was 
unconstitutional.63 Same-sex marriage can be legitimized or 
banned through legislation, court action,64 or both, with 
different results, as is the case in California. In California, there 
has been a strange dance between the legislature, the courts, 
and the electorate.65 Ruling on the legislative prohibition 
against same-sex marriage, the California Supreme Court found 
the statute to be unconstitutional.66 This decision was then 
invalidated by the passage of Proposition 8, a constitutional 
amendment, which defined marriage as between a man and a 
woman.67 
The New York Court of Appeals, unlike the California 
Supreme Court, analyzed the New York statute‟s constitutional 
issue under a rational basis test, the lowest level of 
constitutional scrutiny, and found that it was rational for the 
legislature to deny same-sex couples the rights and benefits of 
marriage.68 In deferring to the intent of the 1909 legislature, the 
 
man and one woman”). 
61. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2006). 
62. Id. (“New York‟s statutory law clearly limits marriage to opposite-sex 
couples.”). 
63. Id. 
64. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (finding IOWA 
CODE § 595.2, which defined marriage as only between a man and a woman, 
unconstitutional). 
65. Rehig, supra note 5, at 152-55. 
66. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008). 
67. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5. 
68. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 6-17. It is worth noting that, although the 
constitutional amendment overturned the decision in In re Marriage Cases 
regarding same-sex marriage, the law as it stands now in California based on 
that decision is that the issue of same-sex marriage requires strict scrutiny. 
This is in stark contrast to the New York court‟s decisions to treat the issue 
under rational basis. 
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court did make clear that it was up to the legislature to make 
any change that would recognize same-sex marriage.69 As 
recently as December 2009, the New York legislature has voted 
specifically not to do so.70 
Despite the Court of Appeals‟ ruling that same-sex couples 
do not have the right to be married in New York, other lower 
courts have addressed the issue of recognizing the same-sex 
marriages of couples married legally in other jurisdictions. For 
example, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department ruled that 
a lesbian couple‟s marriage legally entered into in Canada 
should be recognized in New York for the purpose of obtaining 
spousal health benefits.71 Other departments have not held 
similarly, distinguishing between marriages and legal civil 
unions.72 In Martinez, the court stated that: 
 
For well over a century, New York has recognized 
marriages solemnized outside of New York unless 
they fall into two categories of exception: (1) 
marriage, the recognition of which is prohibited 
by the “positive law” of New York and (2) 
marriages involving incest or polygamy, both of 
which fall within the prohibitions of “natural 
law.”73 
 
In an interesting analysis and application of the Hernandez 
decision, the court reasoned that if the Court of Appeals stated 
that the legislature could pass a (positive) law permitting same-
sex marriage, then that law, by definition, would not be in 
opposition with public policy.74 
Shortly thereafter, in 2008, then-Governor David Paterson 
 
69. Id. at 1-5. 
70. Jeremy W. Peters, New York Senate Turns Back Bill on Gay 
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2009, at A1. 
71. Martinez v. Cnty. of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 2008). 
72. See, e.g., Langan v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 849 N.Y.S.2d 105 (App. 
Div. 3d Dep‟t 2007) (declining to recognize a civil union from Vermont for the 
purpose of granting death benefits). 
73. Martinez, 850 N.Y.S.2d at 742. 
74. Id. at 192. 
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issued an executive order directing state agencies to recognize 
same-sex marriages performed in other states or foreign 
countries.75 This directive has been upheld, at least at the trial 
level,76 and continues to be the policy for state agencies. 
Currently in New York, therefore, same-sex couples may not 
marry legally in the state, but the law compels recognition of 
same-sex marriages entered into in other states or countries. 
The implications and contradictions of this duality extend 
beyond the obvious areas of health and death benefits, to the 
more complex and constantly evolving areas of adoption and 
child custody. 
 
B.    Adoption 
 
In New York, the DRL states that “[a]n adult unmarried 
person, an adult married couple together, or any two unmarried 
adult intimate partners together may adopt another person.”77 
Again, although it might be inferred, the language does not 
specifically refer to same-sex couples as adoption laws in some 
other states do.78 In 1995, the Court of Appeals addressed the 
issue of adoptions by unmarried couples (both heterosexual and 
homosexual).79 Specifically, the court held that same-sex 
partners could legally adopt a child together in New York (if 
that is found to be in the interest of the child).80 
 
75. Arlene G. Dubin & Sheila Agnew, As the Same-Sex Landscape Evolves 
Prepare to Serve This New Group of Clients, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 10, 2009. 
76. Golden v. Paterson, 877 N.Y.S.2d 822, 837 (Sup. Ct. 2008). Taxpayers 
challenged the executive order on the basis of state expending funds for 
benefits or entitlements for spouses previously not eligible. Here the court‟s 
application of the rational basis test worked against those challenging the 
order. In any event the court, albeit a supreme court, upheld the validity of the 
order. 
77. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 2010). The statute was 
amended in 2010 to include unmarried couples. Prior to the amendment the 
statute read: “an adult unmarried person or an adult husband and his adult 
wife together may adopt another person.” 
78. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (West 2007) (“Adoption by 
couples of the same gender is prohibited.”). 
79. In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995). 
80. Id. at 405 (“New York has not adopted a policy disfavoring adoption 
by either single persons or homosexuals. In fact, the most recent legislative 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/5
2011] BAND-AID SOLUTIONS 705 
 
While this decision put gay and lesbian couples on 
comparable footing with their heterosexual counterparts with 
respect to adopting a child who is a biological stranger to both 
parents, it did not address the fundamental difference between 
a child born to a married couple and a child born to a committed 
lesbian couple. When a child is born into a marriage, it is 
presumed that the husband of the mother is the child‟s father,81 
even when the husband may not be the “genetic” father. 
Conversely, if one member of a lesbian couple gives birth to a 
child in New York, which does not allow for same-sex marriage, 
the partner of the mother has no legal right or connection to the 
child, even if there has been an ongoing relationship with the 
intention, and some history, of raising the child together.82 
Second parent adoption became the method by which same-
sex couples could establish legal parentage in such situations. 
The Court of Appeals ruled on this issue in In re Jacob.83 The 
court held that, although the DRL specifies that, when an 
adoption takes place the biological parent is relieved of all 
parental duties,84 a termination of parental rights is not 
required when a child is being adopted but remains in the 
family unit.85 It applied the same legislative exception that 
allows for step-parent adoption without the termination of the 
 
document relating to the subject urges courts to construe section 117 in 
precisely the manner we have as it cautions against discrimination against 
„nonmarital children‟ and „unwed parents.‟ An interpretation of the statute 
that avoids such discrimination or hardship is all the more appropriate here 
where a contrary ruling could jeopardize the legal status of the many New 
York children whose adoptions by second parents have already taken place.” 
(citations omitted)). 
81. Wald, supra note 36, at 400. 
82. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991). For a thorough 
examination of this case, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Family Law Cases as Law 
Reform Litigation: Unrecognized Parents and the Story of Alison D. v. Virginia 
M., 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 307 (2008). 
83. 660 N.E.2d at 398. 
84. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(a) (McKinney 2010) (“After the making of 
an order of adoption the birth parents of the adoptive child shall be relieved of 
all parental duties toward and of all responsibilities for and shall have no 
rights over such adoptive child or to his property by descent or succession, 
except as hereinafter stated.”). 
85. In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 403-04. 
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rights of the biological parent.86 The case decided was the 
consolidation of two cases, one of which involved an unmarried 
heterosexual couple and the other involved a lesbian couple who 
conceived a child through ART.87 In its holding, the court made 
a statement that may portend the crux of many issues ahead 
regarding same-sex parentage and marriage: 
 
These concerns are particularly weighty in Matter 
of Dana. Even if the Court were to rule against 
him on this appeal, the male petitioner in Matter 
of Jacob could still adopt by marrying Jacob‟s 
mother. Dana, however, would be irrevocably 
deprived of the benefits and entitlements of 
having as her legal parents the two individuals 
who have already assumed that role in her life, 
simply as a consequence of her mother‟s sexual 
orientation.88 
 
Recently a surrogate court in New York has gone a step 
further. In In re Adoption of Sebastian,89 the court heard a case 
involving a lesbian couple who were legally married in the 
Netherlands and who established a family through ART, where 
one partner donated an egg, which was fertilized and implanted 
in the ovary of the other who carried it to term.90 The court 
recognized that, in such a situation, determining the legal 
mother of the child is equivocal at best.91 New York has not 
adopted the Uniform Parentage Act (2000),92 which does not 
establish a test to determine legal motherhood but does imply 
that the gestational mother is presumed to be the legal 
mother.93 Instead the courts in New York, without statutory 
guidance or Court of Appeals precedent, must rely on a range of 
 
86. Id. (applying N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(d)). 
87. Id. at 398. 
88. Id. at 405. 
89. 879 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sur. Ct. 2009). 
90. Id. at 678-79. 
91. Id. at 687. 
92. Id. at 690. 
93. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a)(1) (amended 2002). 
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persuasive decisions. The challenge is that those decisions are 
not consistent. Courts have held that “in [an] „egg donation‟ 
case, the wife, who is the gestational mother, is the natural 
mother of the children . . . .”94 Other courts, however, have 
placed dispositive weight on the genetic relation between 
mother and child and determined that the egg donor was, in 
fact, the legal mother.95 In fact, the Sebastian court admitted 
that the standard could be neither, but instead applied a case-
by-case balancing of the two different standards.96 
It is important to recognize that there are two issues that 
underlie the court‟s consideration of this case. The first is a legal 
schism between how the situation could or would be resolved if 
the couple was heterosexual.97 The second is the failure of the 
existing law, or even a binding judicial decision, to address the 
rapid advancement of ART and the different ways in which it is 
now used, particularly with respect to same-sex committed 
partners.98 In addressing the first issue, the court made an 
implied side-step and considered the two-mother issue a gender 
classification,99 and it analyzed the law under a constitutional 
“heightened scrutiny” standard.100 
To its credit, the court could have easily focused narrowly 
on only New York law and how it was applied in this particular 
case. In New York, a child born into a marriage is legally 
 
94. McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480 (App. Div. 1994). 
95. Arredondo v. Nodelman, 622 N.Y.S.2d 181, 182 (Sup. Ct. 1994). 
96. In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 687 (referencing K.M. v. 
E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005), a California Supreme Court case, which held 
that a child could have two parents (mothers)—one based on gestation and one 
based on genetics). 
97. Id. at 687-88. 
98. Id. at 680. 
99. This presumes that the issue can be only fully discussed when one 
parent gives birth to the child. Homosexual men would be subject to the same 
classification, but the analysis would be under a different set of constraints. 
Both men would have to adopt the child since neither would be seen to have a 
presumption of parenthood. Id. at 688-89. Interestingly, the classification fails 
to consider the situation in which one member of a same-sex male couple 
donates sperm to create an ovum with the intention of parenting the child. 
Seen this way, it may be less clear whether this was a gender classification 
rather than a sexual orientation classification, which most likely would not be 
subject to intermediate scrutiny. 
100. Id. at 689. 
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presumed to be the child of the husband.101 Therefore, through 
some minor interpretation of the language, a child born into a 
valid same-sex marriage in New York would, absent a legal 
action to the contrary, confer parental rights to the non-
gestational parent. Because, by executive order, New York 
recognizes legal same-sex marriages entered into in other 
jurisdictions,102 the parents of Sebastian—legally married in the 
Netherlands103—would be considered legally married in New 
York. Applying this analysis, the birth and non-birth mothers 
would, in New York, be Sebastian‟s legal parents. The court 
further identifies two other available options, somewhat less 
radical than adoption, which the couple could employ to try to 
establish parentage.104 The court could have stopped here; 
second parent adoption would appear to be unnecessary.105 The 
court, however, significantly points out that, because of the 
disparate legal status of same-sex couples throughout the 
United States, the only way to create a presumption of 
parentage that would be protected by the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the Constitution, and thus travel from state to state, 
is by granting an adoption, ironically unnecessary in New 
York.106 
What the court does not mention, but is nonetheless 
particularly significant, is the fact that recognition of the 
couple‟s marriage in New York is due to an executive order, not 
a statutory or constitutional provision. Governor Paterson‟s 
successor, Governor Andrew Cuomo, stated during his campaign 
that, “I don‟t want to be the governor who just proposes 
marriage equality. . . . I want to be the governor who signs the 
 
101. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 24(1) (McKinney 2010); see also N.Y. FAM. 
CT. ACT § 516-a (McKinney 2009). It is, however, unclear how much of this 
statute has been rendered unconstitutional as a result of the Sebastian 
decision. 
102. Dubin & Agnew, supra note 75, at 9. 
103. In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 679. 
104. The couple could apply for an amended birth certificate, see, e.g., Doe 
v. N.Y. Bd. of Health, 782 N.Y.S.2d 180, 184 (Sup. Ct. 2004), or they could file 
an acknowledgement of paternity. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4135-b (1)(a) 
(McKinney 2010). 
105. In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 692. 
106. Id. at 692-93. 
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law that makes equality a reality in the state of New York.”107 
Given this sentiment, it is unlikely that he would be inclined to 
rescind the executive order. However, the Democrat-controlled 
state legislature failed to pass legislation allowing for same-sex 
marriage prior to the election,108 and, with the Republican Party 
taking control of the state senate,109 is doubtful than Governor 
Cuomo will have any bill to sign in the foreseeable future. 
Consequently, not only is same-sex marriage unlikely to become 
allowed in New York, but recognition of foreign same-sex 
marriage is tenuous; a court decision or ballot initiative away 
from elimination. 
 
C.   Surrogacy 
 
The second causal issue in the Adoption of Sebastian case is 
the legal confusion that is created by the more extensive and 
creative use of gestational surrogacy. There are two traditional 
branches of surrogacy, which roughly correspond to two 
motivational forces.110 Full surrogacy, which entails a woman 
carrying her own ovum to term for the benefit of another 
(woman or couple), has been looked at as a way to avoid 
pregnancy and delivery.111 Because there is no conflict between 
genetics and gestation, the mother is unarguably the legal 
parent. Gestational surrogacy, where a woman carries a 
genetically different ovum to term, has been traditionally 
 
107. Celeste Katz, Cuomo Tells Gay Activists He Will Legalize Same-Sex 
Marriage, Make ‘Equality a Reality' in New York, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 14, 
2010, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/2010/10/14/2010-10-
14_cuomo_tells_gay_ 
activists_he_will_legalize_samesex_marriage_make_equality_a_real.html. 
108. Jeremy W. Peters, New York State Senate Votes Down Gay Marriage 
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009, at A1. 
109. Brendan Scott & Ginger Adams Otis, GOP Takes the State Senate, 
N.Y. POST, Dec. 5, 2010, at 2. 
110. For a fascinating historical and legal analysis of sperm and egg 
donations, gestational and full surrogacy, and the economic and social 
implications of the distinction between the two, see Noa Ben-Asher, The 
Curing Law: On the Evolution of Baby-Making Markets, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1885 (2009). 
111. Id. at 1887. 
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viewed as a cure for infertility.112 Due to this perhaps erroneous 
categorization, full surrogacy, particularly when there is a 
financial component to the adoption arrangement, has been 
viewed as “baby-selling.”113 Gestational surrogacy, on the other 
hand, has been viewed as a medical response to infertility and, 
accordingly, has seen less hostility from society and given more 
deference from the courts.114 
The New York legislature, however, responding perhaps to 
the stigma of the concept of “baby-selling,” passed laws which 
have repercussions beyond the limited confines of full surrogacy. 
The DRL states that surrogate contracts are unenforceable 
because they are contrary to the public policy of the state.115 
While this might be viewed to be a prohibition against baby-
selling, the statute defines surrogate parenting contracts as 
follows: 
 
“Surrogate parenting contract” shall mean any 
agreement, oral or written, in which: 
(a) a woman agrees either to be inseminated with 
the sperm of a man who is not her husband or to 
be impregnated with an embryo that is the 
product of an ovum fertilized with the sperm of a 
man who is not her husband; and 
(b) the woman agrees to, or intends to, surrender 
or consent to the adoption of the child born as a 
result of such insemination or impregnation.116 
 
As such, under this law any agreement, even if just to allow for 
the adoption of an ART child by a committed same-sex partner, 
is unenforceable. The statute further provides that in any 
dispute arising concerning the parental rights of the egg or 
sperm donor, the gestational mother‟s right of parentage 
 
112. Id. 
113. Id. at 1906-12. 
114. Id. at 1923-24. 
115. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2010). 
116. Id. § 121(4)(a)-(b). 
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supersedes any surrogate parenting agreement.117 
The implications of this may have broad repercussions. 
Although the Sebastian court mentioned the lack of guidance 
regarding motherhood when there is a conflict between 
gestational and genetic “mothers,”118 it did not appear to 
consider the ramifications of the DRL in conjunction with a 
small, mostly overlooked, technical detail of the case. The court 
alludes to the situation in which both genetics and gestation can 
be determinants of parentage,119 but does not specifically apply 
the DRL to address this question. What is telling, however, is 
the fact that the court granted an adoption to the genetic 
mother rather than to the gestational mother.120 What the court 
is doing in this case, without necessarily intending to, is 
affirming the interpretation of the DRL that says that, absent 
any subsequent adoptive process, the gestational mother is the 
legal mother regardless of the intention of the parties. While 
this may make sense in New York, an argument could be made 
that less than twenty five miles away in New Jersey the 
decision would have been to allow an adoption by the 
gestational mother if there were clear evidence that the 
intention was for the genetic mother to raise the child.121 
The problem would seem to be that, when written, 
surrogacy laws did not contemplate the use of ART in a way 
distinct from an infertility cure or baby-selling. As committed 
same-sex couples, by necessity, employ ART to become co-
 
117. Id. § 124(1). 
118. In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 681 (Sur. Ct. 2009) 
(“At present there is no clear law in New York determining the relationship 
between a child and various women who may lay claim to parentage through 
genetic or gestational relationship.”). 
119. Id. at 680. The court references, in particular, California which has 
used intent as the critical test for determining the legal mother. Johnson v. 
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1993) (“[W]e do not believe this case 
can be decided without enquiring into the parties' intentions as manifested in 
the surrogacy agreement.”). It is important to note, however, that Ohio, New 
Jersey, and Tennessee have all followed the rule that if the genetic parents 
were known and showed the intention, before the birth, to act as parents then 
they are determined to be the legal parents. See Wald, supra note 36, at 391-
92. 
120. In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 693. 
121. See Wald, supra note 36, at 391-92. 
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parents, courts are struggling to determine parentage without 
clear legislative guidelines. This lack of clarity was best 
expressed by an Ohio court: 
 
The court finds that there are no statutory or 
constitutional sections granting it authority to 
render a declaratory-judgment action to 
determine parentage and to issue an order 
directing the hospital expecting to deliver the 
unborn child to designate the genetic or biological 
parents as the natural and legal parents of the 
child. The court finds that it lacks subject-matter 
jurisdiction to determine parentage of an unborn 
child that is the subject of a surrogacy agreement 
in a declaratory-judgment action. The legislature 
should consider enacting legislation that 
addresses the legal rights of children born under 
surrogacy agreements.122 
 
In essence, the Ohio judiciary is throwing up its hands and 
telling the legislature that the laws, as enacted, do not offer 
certainty as to parentage in gestational surrogacy situations 
between committed same-sex partners. The Sebastian court 
may have recognized, and, to an extent, addressed the essential 
problem of establishing legal parentage which exists when the 
validity of a couple‟s marital status changes when they move 
from state to state. It did not, however, consider the more 
fundamental question occurring when a child has a genetic and 
a gestational mother, both of whom want to establish legal 
parentage—who is the already existing legal mother? Although 
it would appear straightforward to interpret the DRL as 
establishing the gestational mother as the legal parent,123 this 
seems at odds with the language in other decisions, which deny 
the parental rights of parents who are neither biological nor 
 
122. Nemcek v. Paskey, 849 N.E.2d 108, 111 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 2006). In its 
decision, the court was rejecting an early decision which determined that 
genetics was the strict determinant of parentage. 
123. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121-22, 124 (McKinney 2010). 
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adoptive.124 
 
IV.  Repercussions of the Increasingly Incompatible Laws in 
New York 
 
By itself DOMA has created a situation that is becoming 
increasingly untenable. Enacted under a Republican majority 
Congress, DOMA was arguably the anti-gay-marriage act.125 
Over the last fourteen years, the push to legitimize some form of 
legally recognized relationship for same-sex couples126 has 
created litigation which has focused on parsing the language of 
the statute in such a way to avoid directly addressing the issue 
of allowing states to deny what has often been seen as a 
fundamental right.127 
New York has not adopted its own DOMA,128 but neither 
does it allow for same-sex marriage or civil unions. The New 
York Court of Appeals has ruled that the legislature has the 
constitutional power to pass a law permitting same-sex 
 
124. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virgina M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991) 
(“[S]he is not the child‟s „parent‟; [sic] that is, she is not the biological mother 
of the child nor is she a legal parent by virtue of an adoption.”); Behrens v. 
Rimland, 822 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (App. Div. 2006) (“[T]he petitioner, who is 
neither an adoptive nor a biological parent of Bryce, lacks standing to seek 
visitation.”). In both these cases, and others with similar holdings, the court is 
making the statement that acting in a parental role does not confer parental 
rights. It is interesting, however, that when the gestational mother was also 
the genetic mother, the court chose to frame the determining factor in terms of 
biology not gestation. 
125. Gabe Vick, The Defense of Marriage Act: The Crossroad of Love and 
Legislation, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 105, 106-07 (2009). 
126. To date, thirteen states allow some form of same-sex marriage or 
civil union. NAT‟L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 20. 
127. E.g., Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 683 n.26 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“Even if Smelt and Hammer were now in a California registered domestic 
partnership, that is not by any means a marriage.”). It is hard, however, to 
reconcile the idea that a domestic partnership is not “treated like a marriage,” 
the operative phrase of the DOMA, when the California Family Code states 
unequivocally “[r]egistered domestic partners shall have the same rights, 
protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities, 
obligations, and duties under law, . . . as are granted to and imposed upon 
spouses.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2009). 
128. NAT‟L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 20. 
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marriage.129 Lower courts have used the reasoning in 
Hernandez to recognize same-sex marriages from other 
jurisdictions,130 and former-Governor Paterson issued an 
executive order that affords rights and protection to same-sex 
couples legally married in other states or countries.131 Despite 
these policy trends, there is no definitive law regarding same-
sex couples in New York. For example, civil unions from other 
states have not been regarded with full faith and credit in New 
York. In Langan v. State Farm Fire & Casualty,132 a New York 
appellate division court held that the state Workers 
Compensation Board was not required to grant death benefits to 
the surviving partner of a Vermont legal civil union.133 
The repercussions of this judicial ambiguity may logically 
lead to inconsistency that would be difficult to reconcile. For 
example, consider three hypothetical same-sex couples: one 
legally married and living in Massachusetts, one living with a 
registered domestic partnership in California, and one having 
lived their whole lives in New York. If all three couples end up 
living in the same apartment building in Manhattan there may 
be three very different circumstances all existing at the same 
address. 
The couple from Massachusetts, by virtue of their valid out-
of-state marriage, would be presumed married under the 
executive order of Governor Paterson and a number of 
persuasive lower court decisions. That presumption would 
vanish in an instant, however, if Governor Cuomo, despite his 
statements to the contrary, rescinded the order, if the 
legislature adopted the DOMA, or if the Court of Appeals held 
that, absent a constitutional or statutory mandate, there was no 
imperative to recognize an out-of-state marriage. 
 
129. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006). 
130. E.g., Lewis v. N.Y. State Dep‟t of Civil Serv., 872 N.Y.S.2d 578 (App. 
Div. 2009) (recognizing out-of-state marriage for the purpose of obtaining 
spousal health benefits); C.M v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. Ct. 2008) 
(highlighting the unique situation that although a same-sex couple may not be 
married in New York, New York will recognize a same-sex marriage from 
another state and grant a divorce). 
131. Dubin & Agnew, supra note 75, at 9. 
132. 849 N.Y.S.2d 105 (App. Div. 2007). 
133. Id. at 78-79. 
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The couple from California would likely not be granted legal 
status with respect to one another. In California, domestic 
partnerships confer the same legal rights as marriage,134 but in 
New York there is no recognition of this legal relationship. For 
example, if one of the two was employed by the state and was 
eligible for family health benefits, it seems the state could deny 
those benefits to the domestic partner.135 
The New York couple knows where they stand. As a result 
of their continuous residence in New York, they would have the 
most unambiguous lack of rights. Regardless of the couple‟s 
intentions or length of relationship, there is currently no way, 
short of traveling to one of the five states that allow for same-
sex marriage and getting married there, for the couple to create 
any sort of legal relationship in New York. 
It could be argued that the Governor and the judicial 
branch are attempting to rectify a situation that the legislature 
has refused to clarify. In failing to adopt DOMA and, as recently 
as December of 2009, failing to pass a bill allowing for same-sex 
marriage,136 the legislature has left the executive and courts to 
apply solutions that are neither enduring nor comprehensive. In 
addition, although New York recognizes marriages from other 
jurisdictions, it does not recognize civil unions or domestic 
partnerships, and the courts have not been inclined to extend 
this recognition.137 
Without legislative guidance, the judiciary faces an even 
more daunting task. Many of the questions raised regarding 
same-sex relationships have to be addressed in the context of 
quickly changing laws. For example, in December of 2006 before 
Governor Paterson‟s executive order in Gonzalez v. Green,138 a 
supreme court ruled on a gay couple‟s petition for divorce. The 
court held that the couple‟s Massachusetts marriage was valid 
 
134. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2010). 
135. Langan, 849 N.Y.S.2d at 107-08. 
136. Peters, supra note 108, at A1. 
137. E.g., Langan, 849 N.Y.S.2d at 108 (“Although we may recognize the 
civil union status of claimant and decedent as a matter of comity, we are not 
thereby bound to confer upon them all of the legal incidents of that status 
recognized in the foreign jurisdiction that created the relationship.”). 
138. 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct. 2006). 
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in neither New York nor Massachusetts.139 The Massachusetts 
law defining marriage stated that “[n]o marriage shall be 
contracted in this commonwealth by a party residing and 
intending to continue to reside in another jurisdiction if such 
marriage would be void if contracted in such other jurisdiction, 
and every marriage contracted in this commonwealth in 
violation hereof shall be null and void.”140 They reasoned that, 
since same-sex marriage was not legal in New York at the time 
of the marriage, the Massachusetts‟ marriage was null and 
void.141 
Twenty months later, in the C.M. v C.C.,142 the court was 
faced with two new legal developments: first, Governor 
Paterson‟s executive order and second, the repeal of the 
Massachusetts statute referred to in Gonzalez.143 Given these 
changes, any couple now married in Massachusetts would have 
that union legally recognized in New York. The court, 
specifically acknowledging these developments, found a way to 
recognize the Massachusetts marriage, ironically for the 
purpose of granting a divorce.144 The cases are strikingly 
similar, and, notwithstanding the executive order, either court 
could have used the other‟s reasoning. The difference in the 
outcome of the two cases, it would seem, would have more to do 
with the rapid changes in the related law, rather than any 
change in the specific controlling law.145 
If the situation created by DOMA and by legislative 
inaction in New York regarding same-sex marriage is 
inconsistent, then those circumstances become almost untenable 
 
139. Id. at 858-59. 
140. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 11 (West 2010) (repealed 2008). 
141. Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 859. 
142. 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. Ct. 2008). 
143. Id. at 887-88. 
144. In a rather parsed analysis, the court decided that since the couple 
was married prior to the Hernandez decision in 2006, which banned same-sex 
marriage in New York, the marriage was at that time not (yet) prohibited in 
New York. Therefore, the (now repealed) Massachusetts statute did not nullify 
their marriage. Id. at 888-89. 
145. Both couples were married in 2005, before the Hernandez decision 
and the repeal of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 11. C.M., 867 N.Y.S.2d at 
885; Gonzalez, 867 N.Y.S.2d at 857. 
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when parentage and ART technological advances are added to 
the mix. If one partner of each of the three hypothetical couples 
living in the same hypothetical building were to become 
pregnant and give birth, increasingly unpredictable and 
incompatible results begin to emerge. 
Technically, the couple from Massachusetts, again through 
the executive order of the Governor, as a married couple would 
be presumptively the legal parents of the child. The Sebastian 
court, however, noted that the presumption of parentage would 
not necessarily travel out of state, that is, would not necessarily 
be given full faith and credit by other states.146 The Sebastian 
court chose to address this issue and allow the non-gestational 
mother to seek a second parent adoption, which would be 
recognized in a foreign state.147 The court acknowledges, 
however, that this solution has two inherent problems: first, 
granting an adoption to a married couple is, at best, redundant, 
and at worst impermissible;148 second, there is the hint of 
gender discrimination in requiring the second parent adoption 
for a married lesbian couple.149 The court asks, “why shouldn‟t 
the lesbian genetic mother of a child born to her partner be 
permitted to utilize either of the existing statutory paternity 
procedures to establish her parentage status and rights, rather 
than being limited to the more expensive, time consuming and 
intrusive adoption mechanism?”150 There is nothing to indicate 
that the Sebastian (surrogate‟s) court‟s opinion would be 
persuasive in any other court if the Massachusetts couple 
petitioned for a second parent adoption. 
The couple from California would have an easier time 
completing a second parent adoption, but may find themselves 
frustrated and confused by the requirement to do so. In 
California, domestic partnerships confer the same legal 
parentage rights as marriage,151 and, if born in California, it is 
 
146. In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 691-93 (Sur. Ct. 
2009). 
147. Id. at 691. 
148. See id. at 683-85. 
149. See id. at 683-88. 
150. Id. at 688. 
151. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2009). 
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likely that the child‟s birth certificate would have automatically 
listed both mothers. In this case, being born in New York may 
benefit the child since it is not at all certain, short of an 
adoption agreement, what weight an out-of-state birth 
certificate or paternity acknowledgement would be given. For 
example, if the non-gestational employee were eligible for family 
health benefits, it seems the state could deny those benefits to 
the domestic partner,152 but how would benefit eligibility for a 
child of domestic partnership be determined? 
The New York couple has the same restricted option 
available. Second parent adoption is the only way that the non-
gestational mother could obtain any parental rights. As courts 
have consistently held, the intention and relationship (other 
than marriage) do not confer any meaningful parental rights.153 
To take the hypothetical situation a step further, the law 
becomes even more unreliable if the pregnancy resulted from an 
ART procedure that impregnated the gestational mother with 
the genetic ovum of the other partner. At this point, all three 
couples face the same murky situation. In applying for a second 
parent adoption to protect the rights of the non-parent, it is not 
at all certain who the presumptive parent is. Certainly, under 
New York‟s DRL, if any sort of surrogacy contract is made, it is 
void and the gestational mother is the presumptive parent.154 
Courts in New York, however, have not been consistent in 
declaring presumptive parent status to the gestational mother. 
In Perry-Rogers v. Fasano,155 the court had to consider the 
situation in which an embryo was implanted in the uterus of the 
wrong woman. When the gestational mother sought visitation 
with the child she bore, but to whom she was not genetically 
related, the court determined that her gestational status did not 
give her standing to seek visitation.156 The language the court 
used, in fact, implies that perhaps the presumption of 
 
152. See Langan v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 849 N.Y.S.2d 105, 107-08 
(App. Div. 2007). 
153. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991); 
Behrens v. Rimland, 822 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (App. Div. 2006). 
154. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 124(1) (McKinney 2010). 
155. 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (App. Div. 2000). 
156. Id. at 74. 
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parenthood lies with the genetic mother.157 The intent analysis 
applied in California,158 which looks not only at gestation and 
genetics, but what the parties actually intended, has also been 
applied in New York.159 
Although one might argue that, in the case of two 
committed individuals jointly asking to have both mothers 
declared as parents, a court would likely choose not to focus on 
the issue of who needs to apply but rather default to recognizing 
the gestational mother as the parent, as did the Sebastian court. 
However, there are plausible scenarios in which the identity of 
the presumptive parent would be at issue. For example, what if 
the New York couple sees their relationship fracture during the 
pregnancy and chooses to separate? The baby carried in the 
womb of one woman is a genetic stranger to her. The non-
gestational woman is the unborn child‟s biological mother. If 
there ensued a contentious custody battle for the unborn, or just 
born, child, where would the court look for guidance? A 
compelling case could be made for considering genetics, 
gestation, or intention to determine parentage. 
A similar quandary might occur if the California couple in 
the hypothetical apartment building, prior to completing a 
second parent adoption, is tragically killed in a car accident. 
Imagine they both died intestate, and each set of grandparents 
bring suit seeking sole custody of the child. Again, each side 
would be able to make a persuasive legal argument supporting 
its claim.160 
 
157. Id. at 73 (“It is apparent . . . that a „gestational mother‟ may possess 
enforceable rights under the law, despite her being a „genetic stranger‟ to the 
child. Given the complex possibilities in these kind of circumstances, it is 
simply inappropriate to render any determination solely as a consequence of 
genetics.”). 
158. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) (“[W]e have felt 
free to take into account the parties‟ intentions, as expressed in the surrogacy 
contract, because in our view the agreement is not, on its face, inconsistent 
with public policy.”). 
159. See McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1994). 
160. The parents of the gestational mother would rely on N.Y. DOM. REL. 
LAW §§ 121-22, 124 (McKinney 2010), while the genetic grandparents would 
argue that decisions holding that biology is a determinate factor in visitation 
or custody would adhere. See, e.g., In re Jordan, 875 N.Y.S.2d 188 (App. Div. 
2009) (“[B]iological or legal strangers to a child have no standing to pursue 
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Perhaps the most convoluted, yet eminently conceivable, 
situation might occur if the couple from Massachusetts, rather 
than employing an anonymous sperm donor, chose to use the 
sperm of a friend, a gay man domiciled in New York and 
married legally in Connecticut. The two couples decide that they 
intend to raise the child with two mothers and two fathers. In 
fact, when the baby is born they list the gestational mother and 
sperm-donor father on the birth certificate. How would a court 
analyze the parentage of the child? Because each couple‟s 
marriage is recognized under former-Governor Paterson‟s 
executive order, and because there is a presumption that the 
married partner is the parent of the child of the spouse, it would 
seem that there are four individuals who could legitimately 
assert parental rights. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
The questions raised by the laws and judicial decisions that 
apply, which often at times contradict each other, have no 
simple answers. Even legislative action clarifying a position on 
same-sex marriage, while a step in the right direction, would 
not be enough. It is hard to divine the motivations of couples 
like the Cora‟s who chose a somewhat complicated application of 
ART, but it cannot be discounted that this may very well be a 
way of attempting to undercut the disparate treatment of 
homosexuals from state to state due to the DOMA. By creating 
situations that cannot be simply and consistently adjudicated by 
lower courts, same-sex couples place a growing pressure on 
appellate courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, to reconcile 
DOMA and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and, perhaps in 
the long run, hold that sexual orientation is a semi-suspect 
classification. Until that time, New York will continue to 
struggle to shore up a crumbling and ill-fated framework. 
 
 
 
 
visitation.”). 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol31/iss2/5
